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<meta name="generator" content="Asciidoctor 2.0.26">
<meta name="author" content="0.0.2">
-<title>PLantUML Diagrams for GnuPG Key Signing</title>
+<title>PLantUML Diagrams for GnuPG Key Signing and Reproducible Builds (SLSA4)</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Open+Sans:300,300italic,400,400italic,600,600italic%7CNoto+Serif:400,400italic,700,700italic%7CDroid+Sans+Mono:400,700">
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@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ body.book #toc,body.book #preamble,body.book h1.sect0,body.book .sect1>h2{page-b
</head>
<body class="article toc2 toc-left">
<div id="header">
-<h1>PLantUML Diagrams for GnuPG Key Signing</h1>
+<h1>PLantUML Diagrams for GnuPG Key Signing and Reproducible Builds (SLSA4)</h1>
<div class="details">
<span id="author" class="author">0.0.2</span><br>
</div>
@@ -520,7 +520,71 @@ body.book #toc,body.book #preamble,body.book h1.sect0,body.book .sect1>h2{page-b
<div class="sect2">
<h3 id="_reproducible_builds_slsa_l4">Reproducible Builds SLSA L4</h3>
<div class="paragraph">
-<p>Modeling Trust, Trust Anchors and Boundaries and Attack Vectors</p>
+<p>Modeling Trust, Trust Anchors and Boundaries and Attack Vectors for SLSA4:</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>The whole process draws heavy inspiration from those implemented by NetBSD, Debian, NixOS and the Tor Browser!</p>
+</div>
+<div class="olist loweralpha">
+<div class="title">Goals:</div>
+<ol class="loweralpha" type="a">
+<li>
+<p>Build process produces identical artefacts (bit-for-bit) from the same source and inputs</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>independent parties can rebuild and verify outputs match the original &#8594; verify freedom from insider threat!</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>require a deterministic build environments</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>all build steps, dependencies, and tooling are tightly controlled and audited</p>
+<div class="olist arabic">
+<ol class="arabic">
+<li>
+<p>security goals:</p>
+</li>
+</ol>
+</div>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>detect tampering in build pipelines or artefacts</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>prevents hidden backdoors introduced during compilation or packaging by a malicious insider</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>ensure integrity of supply chain, dependencies and build tools</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>enables independent verification without trusting the original builder</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>drastrically reduce insider and supply chain attack surface</p>
+<div class="olist arabic">
+<ol class="arabic">
+<li>
+<p>Zero Trust:</p>
+</li>
+</ol>
+</div>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>never trust, always verify!</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>verifiable evidence (rebuild &amp;&amp; compare)</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>eliminates implicit trust in build pipeline</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>build system considered untrustworthy</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>combine with signed artefacts and attestation frameworks for full supply chain integrity</p>
+</li>
+</ol>
</div>
<div class="sect3">
<h4 id="_the_whole_implementation">The whole implementation</h4>
@@ -566,7 +630,7 @@ body.book #toc,body.book #preamble,body.book h1.sect0,body.book .sect1>h2{page-b
</div>
<div id="footer">
<div id="footer-text">
-Last updated 2026-03-14 18:58:41 +0100
+Last updated 2026-05-05 17:43:18 +0200
</div>
</div>
</body>