Pages Versionpages

author: Stefan Schumacher <public@cryptomancer.de> 2026-05-05 17:53:09 +0200
committer: Stefan Schumacher <public@cryptomancer.de> 2026-05-05 17:53:09 +0200
commit: dc79114e67cf4343d21152c52af1b936b581755e (patch)
tree: 3ae1fee65b915ca36e60f8822c22caeb4b1058ea /PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download
parent: 6c779fd161e8d2957dfec041139d45c4ecc86697 (diff)
3 files changed, 106 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.adoc b/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.adoc
index 7fa6b8b..fb7b965 100644
--- a/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.adoc
+++ b/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.adoc
@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
-= PLantUML Diagrams for GnuPG Key Signing
+= PLantUML Diagrams for GnuPG Key Signing and Reproducible Builds (SLSA4)
 0.0.2
 :pdf-page-size: A3
 :pdf-page-layout: landscape
 
+
+
+// tag::inhalt[]
+
 I am trying to model implicit and explicit trust in Zero Trust Architecture diagrams for Threat Modeling. 
 
 So I need to bring together the Blue Team/White Hat perspective and the Red Team/Black Hat stuff. 
@@ -32,7 +36,9 @@ image::300-NetBSD-RelEng-STRIDE.png[]
 
 == Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts
 
-A simple threat model for SLSA Level 1 and Leve 4 build and distribution pipelines. 
+=== SLSA L1
+
+A simple threat model for SLSA Level 1: 
 
 image::200-ThreatModel-SLSA1-DownloadSig.png[]
 
@@ -40,7 +46,33 @@ image::200-ThreatModel-SLSA1-DownloadSig.png[]
 
 === Reproducible Builds SLSA L4
 
-Modeling Trust, Trust Anchors and Boundaries and Attack Vectors
+Modeling Trust, Trust Anchors and Boundaries and Attack Vectors for SLSA4:
+
+The whole process draws heavy inspiration from those implemented by NetBSD, Debian, NixOS and the Tor Browser!
+
+
+. general goals
+.. Build process produces identical artefacts (bit-for-bit) from the same source and inputs
+.. independent parties can rebuild and verify outputs match the original -> verify freedom from insider threat!
+.. require a deterministic build environments
+.. all build steps, dependencies, and tooling are tightly controlled and audited
+. security goals:
+.. detect tampering in build pipelines or artefacts
+.. prevents hidden backdoors introduced during compilation or packaging by a  malicious insider
+.. ensure integrity of supply chain, dependencies and build tools
+.. enables independent verification without trusting the original builder
+.. drastrically reduce insider and supply chain attack surface
+. Zero Trust:
+.. never trust, always verify!
+.. verifiable evidence (rebuild && compare)
+.. eliminates implicit trust in build pipeline
+.. build system considered untrustworthy
+.. combine with signed artefacts and attestation frameworks for full supply chain integrity
+
+
+
+
+
 
 ==== The whole implementation
 
@@ -58,3 +90,6 @@ image::202-ThreatModel-SLSA4-ReproducibleBuilds-TrustAnchor.png[]
 === Motivation/Business Layer: Risk/Security Overlay
 
 image::203-SLSA4-ReproducibleBuilds-L1-Motivation.png[]
+
+
+// end::inhalt[]
diff --git a/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.html b/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.html
index 5bc2456..712e918 100644
--- a/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.html
+++ b/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.html
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
 <meta name="generator" content="Asciidoctor 2.0.26">
 <meta name="author" content="0.0.2">
-<title>PLantUML Diagrams for GnuPG Key Signing</title>
+<title>PLantUML Diagrams for GnuPG Key Signing and Reproducible Builds (SLSA4)</title>
 <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Open+Sans:300,300italic,400,400italic,600,600italic%7CNoto+Serif:400,400italic,700,700italic%7CDroid+Sans+Mono:400,700">
 <style>
 /*! Asciidoctor default stylesheet | MIT License | https://asciidoctor.org */
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ body.book #toc,body.book #preamble,body.book h1.sect0,body.book .sect1>h2{page-b
 </head>
 <body class="article toc2 toc-left">
 <div id="header">
-<h1>PLantUML Diagrams for GnuPG Key Signing</h1>
+<h1>PLantUML Diagrams for GnuPG Key Signing and Reproducible Builds (SLSA4)</h1>
 <div class="details">
 <span id="author" class="author">0.0.2</span><br>
 </div>
@@ -520,7 +520,71 @@ body.book #toc,body.book #preamble,body.book h1.sect0,body.book .sect1>h2{page-b
 <div class="sect2">
 <h3 id="_reproducible_builds_slsa_l4">Reproducible Builds SLSA L4</h3>
 <div class="paragraph">
-<p>Modeling Trust, Trust Anchors and Boundaries and Attack Vectors</p>
+<p>Modeling Trust, Trust Anchors and Boundaries and Attack Vectors for SLSA4:</p>
+</div>
+<div class="paragraph">
+<p>The whole process draws heavy inspiration from those implemented by NetBSD, Debian, NixOS and the Tor Browser!</p>
+</div>
+<div class="olist loweralpha">
+<div class="title">Goals:</div>
+<ol class="loweralpha" type="a">
+<li>
+<p>Build process produces identical artefacts (bit-for-bit) from the same source and inputs</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>independent parties can rebuild and verify outputs match the original &#8594; verify freedom from insider threat!</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>require a deterministic build environments</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>all build steps, dependencies, and tooling are tightly controlled and audited</p>
+<div class="olist arabic">
+<ol class="arabic">
+<li>
+<p>security goals:</p>
+</li>
+</ol>
+</div>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>detect tampering in build pipelines or artefacts</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>prevents hidden backdoors introduced during compilation or packaging by a  malicious insider</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>ensure integrity of supply chain, dependencies and build tools</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>enables independent verification without trusting the original builder</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>drastrically reduce insider and supply chain attack surface</p>
+<div class="olist arabic">
+<ol class="arabic">
+<li>
+<p>Zero Trust:</p>
+</li>
+</ol>
+</div>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>never trust, always verify!</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>verifiable evidence (rebuild &amp;&amp; compare)</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>eliminates implicit trust in build pipeline</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>build system considered untrustworthy</p>
+</li>
+<li>
+<p>combine with signed artefacts and attestation frameworks for full supply chain integrity</p>
+</li>
+</ol>
 </div>
 <div class="sect3">
 <h4 id="_the_whole_implementation">The whole implementation</h4>
@@ -566,7 +630,7 @@ body.book #toc,body.book #preamble,body.book h1.sect0,body.book .sect1>h2{page-b
 </div>
 <div id="footer">
 <div id="footer-text">
-Last updated 2026-03-14 18:58:41 +0100
+Last updated 2026-05-05 17:43:18 +0200
 </div>
 </div>
 </body>
diff --git a/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.pdf b/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.pdf
index 0e84285..fd9c3b0 100644
--- a/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.pdf
+++ b/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.pdf
author	Stefan Schumacher <public@cryptomancer.de>	2026-05-05 17:53:09 +0200
committer	Stefan Schumacher <public@cryptomancer.de>	2026-05-05 17:53:09 +0200
commit	dc79114e67cf4343d21152c52af1b936b581755e (patch)
tree	3ae1fee65b915ca36e60f8822c22caeb4b1058ea /PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download
parent	6c779fd161e8d2957dfec041139d45c4ecc86697 (diff)