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@startuml
!include <archimate/Archimate>
left to right direction
skinparam rectangle {
BackgroundColor #FFF6F6
BorderColor #550000
}
skinparam note {
BackgroundColor #FFFFCC
}
' makes Rel_ green
skinparam ArrowFontColor<<greenRel>> green
' Anchor as SVG sprite
sprite $anchor <svg viewBox="0 0 204.851 204.851">
<path fill="#000000" d="M139.518,128.595l16.834,16.336c0,0-20.644,29.877-42.725,30.473
c0.479,0,0.117-84.092,0.039-104.472c14.694-4.797,25.402-18.182,25.402-34.117
c0-20.009-16.697-36.218-37.273-36.218c-20.615,0-37.312,16.209-37.312,36.208
c0,15.671,10.376,28.929,24.748,33.961l0.098,104.277c-26.643-1.837-42.061-27.474-42.061-27.474
l17.997-17.41L0,120.505l9.887,63.301l17.362-16.795c15.036,12.105,32.017,37.244,72.876,37.244
c51.332-1.309,63.184-28.939,76.344-39.804l18.993,18.514l9.389-63.907L139.518,128.595z
M82.558,36.208c0-10.298,8.608-18.661,19.218-18.661s19.257,8.363,19.257,18.661
c0,10.327-8.647,18.681-19.257,18.681S82.558,46.535,82.558,36.208z"/>
</svg>
right header
= Threat Model - Reproducible Builds according to SLSA Level 4
using independent GnuPG signatures and keys
as well as Reproducible Builds according to SLSA Level 4
corresponding to the Tor Browser release process, as well as NixOS, Debian and NetBSD
= %date("yyyy-MM-dd hh:mm")
endheader
right footer
= Advantages:
* Consistency between source code and binaries through Reproducible Builds
* No single trust anchor -> at least 2 independent builders
* Subsequent manipulation detectable through checksums in the Git Transparency Log
* Insider attacks made more difficult through multiple signatures
* Key misuse detectable through checksums in the Git Transparency Log and temporal correlation via timestamps
* Each box is a trust boarder
endfooter
caption
= Threat Model - Reproducible Builds according to SLSA Level 4
endcaption
actor "Downloader\n(Verifier)" as User #Green
actor "Internet\n(Insecure)" as Net
actor "NTP Server 1" as NTP1
actor "NTP Server 2 " as NTP2
actor "Attacker\n(Insider / External)" as Attacker #Red
'actor "Trusted Commiter 1" as Committer1
'actor "Trusted Commiter 2" as Committer2
actor "Keyserver 1" as Keyserver1
actor "Keyserver 2" as Keyserver2
rectangle "Maintainer" {
rectangle "Source Code\n(in Git) <$anchor{scale=0.1,color=green}>" as Source
rectangle "Git Release Tag\n(GnuPG-signed) <$anchor{scale=0.1,color=green}>" as Tag
}
rectangle "Independent build pipelines\n(at least 2)" {
rectangle "Pipe A <$anchor{scale=0.1,color=lightgreen}>b1" as B1
rectangle "Pipe B <$anchor{scale=0.1,color=lightgreen}>b2" as B2
}
Motivation_Goal(TAb, "combined Trust")
' Rel_Aggregation(TAb, B1, "combines", $lineColor="green", $textColor="green")
TAb o-- B1 : <color:green>combines TA</color>
TAb o-- B2 : <color:green>combines TA</color>
rectangle "Download artefacts" {
rectangle "Artefact A\n(Checksum)" as A1
rectangle "Artefact B\n(Checksum)" as A2
}
rectangle "Git Transparency Log\n(tamper-hardened) <$anchor{scale=0.1,color=green}>" as Log
rectangle "Distributed ledger with\n Merkle Tree records\n (Blockchain) <$anchor{scale=0.1,color=green}>" as Ledger
rectangle "Operational environment\n(of the downloader)" {
rectangle "Known public signing keys\n(obtained from at least\n 2 independent trust paths)" as Keys
rectangle "Rebuild pipeline\n(Reproducible)" as Rebuild
rectangle "Verification policy\n (organisational measure\n from BSI TR)" as Policy
}
NTP1 --> Log : Time
NTP2 --> Log : Time
Keyserver1 --> Keys : retrieves
Keyserver2 --> Keys : retrieves
Source --> B1
Source --> B2
B1 --> A1
B2 --> A2
A1 --> Log : Checksum
A2 --> Log : Checksum
A1 --> Ledger : Checksum
A2 --> Ledger : Checksum
Tag --> Source
Net --> User
Attacker -[#Red]-> B1 : compromises
Attacker -[#Red]-> Net : controls
Attacker -[#Red]-> Tag : compromises private key
'// Commiter1 --> Tag : generates valid signature
'// Commiter2 --> Tag : generates valid signature
User --> Rebuild
User --> Log
Keys --> Policy
Rebuild --> Policy
Policy --> User : ACCEPT / REJECT
@enduml
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