From dc79114e67cf4343d21152c52af1b936b581755e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Schumacher Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 17:53:09 +0200 Subject: Pages Version --- README.html | 234 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 227 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'README.html') diff --git a/README.html b/README.html index 5bf5ec8..166f8de 100644 --- a/README.html +++ b/README.html @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ + Security Architecture Notes and Patterns - +
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This is the pages version of Stefan Schumacher’s Codeberg Repository at https://codeberg.org/0xKaishakunin/Architecture

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It contains several architecural patterns and exercises with PlantUML with regards to modeling trust and zero trust architecture patterns

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1. From GnuPG Keysigning Party to Reproducile Builds according to SLSA4

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I am trying to model implicit and explicit trust in Zero Trust Architecture diagrams for Threat Modeling.

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So I need to bring together the Blue Team/White Hat perspective and the Red Team/Black Hat stuff.

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2. DFD: Keysigning Simple

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+100 GnuPG Keysigning DFD +
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3. SEQ: Keysigning with ID check and WoT

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+100 GnuPG Keysigning SEQ KSP WoT +
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4. NetBSD RelEng Attack STRIDE

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The ISO Image is built, signed and uploaded to the WWW server, as well as the Signature file and checksums.

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Evil Black Hat hacks the webserver, and swaps the ISO image for a manipulated one with a valid Signature.

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The manipulated Signature verifies the fake-integrity of the manipulated ISO image, but not the authenticity.

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+300 NetBSD RelEng STRIDE +
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5. Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts

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5.1. SLSA L1

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A simple threat model for SLSA Level 1:

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+200 ThreatModel SLSA1 DownloadSig +
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5.2. Reproducible Builds SLSA L4

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Modeling Trust, Trust Anchors and Boundaries and Attack Vectors for SLSA4:

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The whole process draws heavy inspiration from those implemented by NetBSD, Debian, NixOS and the Tor Browser!

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  1. -

    GetPlantUML-CheatSheets.sh

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    general goals

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      Build process produces identical artefacts (bit-for-bit) from the same source and inputs

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      independent parties can rebuild and verify outputs match the original → verify freedom from insider threat!

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      require a deterministic build environments

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      all build steps, dependencies, and tooling are tightly controlled and audited

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    security goals:

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      detect tampering in build pipelines or artefacts

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      prevents hidden backdoors introduced during compilation or packaging by a malicious insider

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      ensure integrity of supply chain, dependencies and build tools

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      enables independent verification without trusting the original builder

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      drastrically reduce insider and supply chain attack surface

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    Zero Trust:

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      never trust, always verify!

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      verifiable evidence (rebuild && compare)

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      eliminates implicit trust in build pipeline

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      build system considered untrustworthy

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      combine with signed artefacts and attestation frameworks for full supply chain integrity

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5.2.1. The whole implementation

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    Trust Boundaries: Rectangles

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    Attack Vectors: Red Arrows

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+201 ThreatModel SLSA4 ReproducibleBuilds +
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    Trust Anchor: Green Anchor

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+202 ThreatModel SLSA4 ReproducibleBuilds TrustAnchor +
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5.3. Motivation/Business Layer: Risk/Security Overlay

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+203 SLSA4 ReproducibleBuilds L1 Motivation +
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6. Links

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    GetPlantUML-CheatSheets.sh

    1. @@ -452,21 +669,21 @@ body.book #toc,body.book #preamble,body.book h1.sect0,body.book .sect1>h2{page-b
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    PlantUML-ModelingTrust

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    PlantUML-ModelingTrust

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      Modeling Trust/Risk/Trust Anchors, Chains, and Boarders in Archimate

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      Modeling Trust/Risk/Trust Anchors, Chains, and Boarders in Archimate, some TextBook patterns

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    PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/

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    PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.html

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      A GnuPG Key Signing Party and Download Signatures (SLSA1) modeled in Archimate

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      A GnuPG Key Signing Party and Download Signatures (SLSA1) as well as Reproducible Builds SLSA4 modeled in Archimate

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