From 8346f109d823a1656f0ef7410c2a4d6365051608 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Schumacher Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 17:24:18 +0200 Subject: Pages Init --- .../GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.html | 573 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 573 insertions(+) create mode 100644 PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.html (limited to 'PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.html') diff --git a/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.html b/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5bc2456 --- /dev/null +++ b/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/README.html @@ -0,0 +1,573 @@ + + + + + + + + +PLantUML Diagrams for GnuPG Key Signing + + + + + +
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I am trying to model implicit and explicit trust in Zero Trust Architecture diagrams for Threat Modeling.

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So I need to bring together the Blue Team/White Hat perspective and the Red Team/Black Hat stuff.

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DFD: Keysigning Simple

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+100 GnuPG Keysigning DFD +
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SEQ: Keysigning with ID check and WoT

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+100 GnuPG Keysigning SEQ KSP WoT +
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NetBSD RelEng Attack STRIDE

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The ISO Image is built, signed and uploaded to the WWW server, as well as the Signature file and checksums.

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Evil Black Hat hacks the webserver, and swaps the ISO image for a manipulated one with a valid Signature.

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The manipulated Signature verifies the fake-integrity of the manipulated ISO image, but not the authenticity.

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+300 NetBSD RelEng STRIDE +
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Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts

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A simple threat model for SLSA Level 1 and Leve 4 build and distribution pipelines.

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+200 ThreatModel SLSA1 DownloadSig +
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Reproducible Builds SLSA L4

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Modeling Trust, Trust Anchors and Boundaries and Attack Vectors

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The whole implementation

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    Trust Boundaries: Rectangles

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    Attack Vectors: Red Arrows

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+201 ThreatModel SLSA4 ReproducibleBuilds +
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    Trust Anchor: Green Anchor

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+202 ThreatModel SLSA4 ReproducibleBuilds TrustAnchor +
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Motivation/Business Layer: Risk/Security Overlay

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+203 SLSA4 ReproducibleBuilds L1 Motivation +
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