From eb4668408ceac440972213053ab0d97f6fa7ae89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: stefan Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2026 18:53:35 +0100 Subject: SLSA models added Signed-off-by: stefan --- .../GnuPG-WoT-Download/200-ThreatModel-SLSA1-DownloadSig.svg | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) create mode 100644 PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/200-ThreatModel-SLSA1-DownloadSig.svg (limited to 'PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/200-ThreatModel-SLSA1-DownloadSig.svg') diff --git a/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/200-ThreatModel-SLSA1-DownloadSig.svg b/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/200-ThreatModel-SLSA1-DownloadSig.svg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3c5b37e --- /dev/null +++ b/PlantUML-ModelingTrust/GnuPG-WoT-Download/200-ThreatModel-SLSA1-DownloadSig.svg @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +Threat Model - Integrity verification of download artifacts with key list!using independent GnuPG signatures and public keysas well as a key list with authorised signing keys2026-02-23 08:08 UTCMaintainerVerification environment(Server)Private key(on hardware token)Release artifact(binary)Signature(.asc)Public keyfrom keyserver(fingerprint verified)gpg --verify *.ascDownloader(Verifier)Attacker(MITM / Mirror)Website with signed key listand information about signature authorisation of the key listsignsretrieves key list and verifies its signaturereplaces key listOK / FAILMaintainer publishes signed artifacts, public GnuPG keys and signed key listThe key list or its signature is the central trust anchorBoth are located in a central place!If the key list and the information about signature authorisation of the key list are replaced, manipulated artifacts with valid signatures can be distributedThe security objective authenticity of the artifacts can therefore be violated \ No newline at end of file -- cgit v1.2.3